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BAR BRIEFS
LAW SCHOOL NOTES
The University of North Dakota School of Law completed
its forty-third year of continuous operation. The total enrollment for the school year 1941-1942 was fifty-five. The following third year students were awarded the Juris Doctor degree:
1. Harold Joe Dale (B.A. 1938) of Chicago, Ill.
2. Lowell A. O'Grady (B.A. 1940), Watford City, N. D.
The degree of Bachelor of Laws were awarded to the following students:
3. *Oliver E. Austinson, Fertile, Minn.
4. William H. Black (B.A. 1940), Grand Forks, N. D.
5. Kenneth W..Brown (Ph. B. 1942), Grand Forks, N. D.
6. Betty C. Calnan, Valley City, N. D.
7. Tobias D. Casey, Dickinson, N. D.
8. Scotty Gladstone, Dupree, S. D.
9. Kenneth M. Knutson, Maxbass, N. D.
10. Norbert J. Muggli, Richardton, N. D.
11. Ralph S. Oliver (B.S.C. 1938), Hankinson, N. D.
12. Richard P. Rausch, Raleigh, N. D.
13. Robert W. Rovelstad (B.A. 1940), Grand Forks, N. D.
14. Gilbert E. Saxowsky (B.S.C. 1940), Dickinson, N. D.
15. Daniel J. Scully, Watertown, S. D.
16. Marvin E. Steffen (B.S.C. 1940), Parshall, N. D.
17. F. Lorene Whitesides (B.A. 1941), Lakota, N. D.
John A. Anderson of St. Thomas, N. D., will complete his requirements for the law degree by August 1, 1942.
The University of North Dakota Chapter of The Order of the
Coif elected three law seniors and one honorary candidate at its
annual meeting. Elected were Norbert J. Muggli, Richardton,
Tobias D. Casey, Dickinson, and Lowell A. O'Grady, Watford
City. The honorary selection was given to Howard G. Fuller of
the Fargo Bar.
Many of the members of the Class of 1942 will be called into
the service of the United States Army or the Navy immediately
after taking the bar examination in June.
*Oliver E. Austinson of Fertile, Minn., is a son of Attorney
Joseph B. Austinson who graduated from the School of Law in
1913.
TAXATION -

GOVERNMENTAL INSTRUMENTALITIES
STATE SALES TAX
A Federal Land Bank, having acquired certain farm properties by foreclosure proceedings, sought to effect repairs and improvements on the buildings and purchased lumber and other
materials from a Bismarck lumber company which demanded
$8.02 as a state sales tax on the purchses. The Federal Land
Bank claimed exemption under Section 26 of the Federal Farm
Loan Act of July 17, 1916, c. 245, 39 Stat. 360, 380, 12 U. S. C. A.
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§§ 931-933. Section 26 provides that "every Federal land bank
....
including the capital and reserve or surplus therein and the
income derived therefrom, shall be exempt from Federal, State,
municipal, and local taxation, except taxes upon real estate held,
purchased, or taken by said bank. . . ." Held, that Federal land
banks are instrumentalities of the federal government engaged
in the performance of an important governmental function, and
that Congress has the power to protect the instrumentalities which
it has constitutionally created. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul
v. Bismarck Lumber Co. et al., 62 S. Ct. 1 (1941).
It has long been settled that the states have no power, by
taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner
control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress
to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 436, 17 U. S. 159
(1819). In Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5, 36, 85 U. S. 5
(1873), Justice Strong lays down the test as being "whether the
tax does in truth deprive the (the government instrumentalities)
of power to serve the government as they were intended to serve
it, or does it hinder the efficient exercise of their power." The
activities of the corporation through which the national government lawfully acts must be regarded as governmental functions
and, as such, entiled to whatever immunity attaches to those
functions when performed by the government itself through its
departments. Congress has not only the power to create a corporation to facilitate the performance of governmental functions
but has the power to protect the governmental functions thus
validly authorized. Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corporation,
308 U. S. 21, 32, 84 L. Ed. 11, 60 S. Ct. 15 (1939). In Panhandle
Oil Co. v. State of Mississippi, 277 U. S. 218, 48 S. Ct. 45, 72 L.
Ed. 857 (1928) it was held that, while the State of Mississippi
may impose charges upon the petitioner for the privilege of
carrying on trade that is subject to the power of the state, it may
not lay a tax upon transactions by which the United States secures the things desired for its governmental purposes.
In several cases it has been held, however, that state sales
taxes could be constitutionally imposed on sales to national parks.
where, in ceding the park territory, the state reserved the right
to tax persons and corporations. See Rainier National Park Co.
v. Martin, 18 F. (2d) 481, 302 U. S' 661, 82 L. Ed. 511, 58 S. Ct.
478 (1937 DC); James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134,
82 L. Ed. 155, 58 S. Ct. 208 (1937). The question arises as to
when shall a government instrumentality be subject to, and when
shall it be immune from, state taxation, and there has developed
the "implied immunity" principle that neither the federal government nor a state may so exercise its respective powers as unduly to burden or impair the effective functioning of the other
within its allotted sphere. The division of the functions of government into those that are strictly governmental and those that
are proprietary nor non-governmental was developed in connection with the problems of the liability of municipal corporations

BAR BRIEFS
for the torts of their agents. The principal test is whether the
state is engaged in a business which constitutes a departure from
the usual governmental functions and to which, by reason of its
nature, the federal taxing power would normally extend. Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214, 55 S. Ct. 171, 79 L. Ed. 291 (1934).
However it has been stated that "the immunity of the federal
government from state taxation seems not to be lost with respect
to activities which would be considered non-governmental if carried on by a state." Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law, p. 106.
In Van Brocklin v. State of Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151, 155, 6 S. Ct.
670, 29 L. Ed. 845 (1886) Justice Gray declared that, "the attempt
to use the taxing power of a state on the means employed by the
government of the Union, in pursuance of the Constitution, is
itself an abuse, because it is the usurpation of a power which the
people of a single state cannot give." The real question would
seem to be whether the application of the distinctions between
governmental and proprietary functions to federal functions is
consistent with the necessity for maintaining federal supremacy.
In South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437, 463, 26 S. Ct.
110, 50 L. Ed. 261 (1905) the Supreme Court upheld a federal
tax imposed upon a liquor enterprise operated by the state. In
that case Justice Brewer stated that, "it is reasonable to hold
that while the former (state) may do nothing by taxation in any
form to prevent the full discharge by the latter (federal government) of its governmental functions, yet whenever a state engages in a business which is of a private nature that business is
not withdrawn from the taxing power of tl~e Nation." While
Congress may, undoubtedly, confer upon the federal instrumentalities of its selection or creation an immunity from state taxation more extensive than that which they have under the implied immunity principle, the states, for their part, seem to be
without power to confer upon their agencies, whether public or
private in character, any immunity beyond that accorded them
under the principle of their implied immunity from federal taxation. Rottschaefer, Constitutional Law, p. 109. In all those cases
in which the court upheld the application of a state tax to the
property or activities of a corporation operating under a federal
charter or performing services for the federal government no
specific exemption from taxation was involved. Thus it would
seem clear that all corporations created by the federal government
which have a legitimate basis serve as agents in the performance
of some power conferred by the Constitution. As agents of the
federal government they are performing functions which can only
be classified as governmental. And in performing governmental
functions they are, under the doctrines of the Supreme Court,
exempt from taxation by the states save as Congress may waive
that immunity. For a good, extensive discussion of this topic
see Stoke, State Taxation and the New Federal Instrumentalities, 22 Iowa Law Review 39 (1937).
JOHN A. ANDERSON
Third Year Law Student.

